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Mac,

On pp 84-85 of his book "The Shame of Savo" Commodore Loxton describes the crucial differences between the U.S.N. second degree of alert, and the version of the same alert state adopted by the R.N./R.A.N.  What I am trying to find out is which version U.S.S. Chicago would have been in immediately prior to the battle. I am guessing that as she had been under the commands of Admirals Crace and Crutchley since February 1942, they would have found the U.S. version unacceptable would have got her working according to their practices and procedures. However a guess is only a guess. Can you cast any light on this?

Also Loxton states that Chicago hadn't fired her main armament since before the attack on Pearl Harbor. This would have meant that a U.S. warship had managed to undergo eight months of wartime service without her main gun crews having completed a single live firing drill. I find this quite remarkable, even allowing for the fact that the exigencies of war would have played merry hell with training schedules. I would be fascinated if you could shed any light on this as well.

U.S.S. Chicago is proving rather difficult with regard to my research. Not too many of her crew members seem to have come forward with their accounts of her actions in the battle. I look forward to hearing from you.

Many thanks, 
Richard.

Richard,

Thank you for your message, your two questions.

1. In Denis and Peggy Warner's: Disaster In The Pacific New Light On The Battle Of Savo Island. Allen and Unwin, North Sydney ,1992.

At pages 108-109 is this statement: " The Chicago had been in condition 1 until about 2030. After consultation with his officers, Captain Bode decided that a modified condition would give everyone time to recover from the exertions of the previuos two days. All stations were fully manned, but the length of watches was reduced to rest as many officers and men as possible in case they had to return to condition 1. The entire crew were fully clothed. No lights except standing red lights were allowed in the living
spaces, and no bathing was permitted.

Above 2030 is the notation 5, which from the book end notes reads: Captain Bode  memorandum for Admiral Hepburn, April 3, 1943, HR, Vol. 2 of 3, P.306, NY.

A brief report about Chicago's state of readiness  from this publication is printed below.

The Australian cruiser was in the second degree of readiness, except that turrets B and Y were not manned, although their crews were sleeping near their quarters. One 4-inch gun on each side of the ship was manned. All guns were empty. The Chicago's state of readiness is not reported.

2. From M. A. Payne's HMAS Australia. The story of the 8 inch Cruiser. 1928-1955. The Naval Historical Society Of Australia. Garden Island Sydney. No date.

I have followed USS Chicago's story, she joined HMAS Australia about February 1942, was present at the Battle of The Coral Sea, but only fired her AA armament then.

The ship was in Sydney Harbour for the Japanese Midget Submarine attack over May 31/ June 1 1942, fired at Ban's Midget, but with secondary or AA armament.

I could find no reference to Chicago firing her 8 inch guns at all. When I was in HMAS Canberra from December 1941, and USS Chicago was a part of our Task Force, there was no occasion that she used her main armament. It would seem that Bruce Loxton's statement in his book is most likely an accurate one.

Of course Chicago did not perform well at Savo, after Crutchley took Australia out of the line and went off to Guadalcanal, Bode as the senior Captain of the Southern Force  was placed in charge by Crutchley, he did not tell the Northern Group he was in command, and Bode elected to lead from the rear rather than the front, he took his ship off to port when all the action was to starboard.

After the Japanese force had moved on to slaughter the Northern Group, and Patterson was alongside Canberra taking off our wounded, Chicago loomed up and opened fire on us. Patterson cut all lines, indicated she would be back, opened fire, lit her search light, and sorted out that mess. Chicago's company had little about which they would want to talk, no wonder you find them reticent. Then in April of 1943, Captain Bode committed suicide. He had not been a lucky Captain, at the time of Pearl Harbor as Captain of Oaklahoma he was ashore when his ship was lost, in Sydney he was not on board at the time of the Midget attack on Chicago, let me hasten to add, on both occasions he had every right to be ashore, but unlucky then to be ashore when his ships needed him onboard.

Incidentally Richard, were you aware that Bruce died from asbestosis last year?

I hope these jottings may be of some use to you, if you think I may be able to assist you further, please ask.

With best wishes and regards,
Mac.

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